The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently released the public version of its decision in an investigation of whether Arista infringes Cisco patents, rejecting Arista’s defense and public interest arguments that the patents allegedly cover a de facto standard and are subject to a FRAND obligation. Arista’s defense was based on Cisco’s submission to IETF of a request for comments document (RFC 5517), which stated it was not a standard, along with a commitment by Cisco to license patents on FRAND terms IF (1) RFC 5517 was adopted as a standard AND (2) the patents are essential to practice such standard. The ITC rejected Arista’s de facto standard defense because, among other things, there was no evidence that RFC 5517 was adopted as an industry standard or that the patents-in-suit covered RFC 5517, both of which were preconditions under Cisco’s commitment to IETF before triggering a FRAND obligation. Continue Reading ITC rejects de facto standard defense (337-TA-944, Cisco v. Arista)
Today, a three-judge Federal Circuit panel (Prost (author), Dyk and Hughes) issued its awaited decision in CSIRO v. Cisco that agreed-in-part and disagreed-in-part with Judge Davis’ damages award based on patents alleged to be essential to the IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard, but which patents did not have any FRAND or other standard-setting obligation (see our July 28, 2014 post on Judge Davis’ decision). This is an important decision that provides incremental insight into proving and determining a reasonable royalty for a standard essential patent, which includes further insight into the Federal Circuit’s first decision on this issue a year ago in Ericsson v. D-Link that involved a standard essential patent that did have a FRAND obligation under the IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard (see our Dec. 5, 2014 post on the Ericsson v. D-Link decision).
This is an important decision to read directly to catch all the nuances and import of the decision, and the incremental guidance it provides in determining a royalty rate as a matter of patent damages law for past infringement of a patent that is essential to a standard. A few particularly important points come from the decision.
First, the Federal Circuit soundly rejected as “untenable” the accused infringer’s argument that there is a “rule” that all patent damages methodologies always must start out using the smallest salable patent-practicing unit. The smallest salable patent practicing unit is a principle that can aid courts to determine if a damages expert’s methodology reliably apportions to the patent only the value that the patented technology provides to the infringing product and not other unpatented features. But it is not the only approach that may be considered, and different cases present different factual circumstances that could lend themselves to different reliable methodologies. For example, damages methodologies properly may rely on real-world comparable licenses to reliably apportion value to the patented technology, whether the royalties are based on end products or components thereof. This decision may very well put to rest arguments that there is some “rule” requiring use of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit or that there is any problem per se in royalties being based on the end product rather than its components.
Second, the Federal Circuit clarified that the need to apportion the value of the patented technology from the value of standardization applies whether or not a standard essential patent is subject to a FRAND or other standard setting obligation. This is based on the long-standing, fundamental principal that statutory damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 must be based on the value of the patented invention and not other unpatented features, whether that’s other unpatented technology in an infringing product or the value of the patent being essential to a standard. Continue Reading Federal Circuit provides guidance on royalty determination for standard essential patents (CSIRO v. Cisco)
Today, in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an accused infringer’s good faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to induced infringement, reversing the Federal Circuit on that issue (see our June 25, 2013 post on the Federal Circuit’s decision). The Court also clarified that the scienter requirement for induced infringement from Global-Tech requires knowledge that the patent was infringed and not merely knowledge of the patent. Finally, perhaps in response to the current patent legislation debate, the Court stated that it was aware of concern that some entities assert patents for purposes of extracting money based more on the cost of defending a patent lawsuit, rather than the merits of the case, and the Court “stress[ed]” that district court’s already have “the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases are dissuaded.”
Patent owner Commil sued Cisco in 2007 for making and selling wireless networking equipment alleged to infringe Commi’s patent, alleging both direct infringement and induced infringement for selling infringing equipment for others to use. Cisco sought reexamination of Commil’s patent, which proceeding ultimately confirmed the validity of the patents. Cisco argued that it had a good-faith belief that the patent was invalid as a defense to induced infringement, but the district court excluded that argument. On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court erred in not permitting Cisco to present evidence of its good-faith belief that the patent was invalid as a defense to induced infringement (see our June 25, 2013 post). The Supreme Court accepted certiorari to review that ruling (see our Dec. 5, 2014 post).
Clarifying Global-Tech’s Scienter Requirement. The Supreme Court first reaffirmed its ruling in Global-Tech that induced infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. The Court rejected the argument by patent owner Commil and the U.S. Government that Global-Tech merely requires knowledge of the patent, stating:
Qualifying or limiting [Global-Tech’s] holding, as the Government and Commil seek to do, would lead to the conclusion, both in inducement and contributory infringement cases, that a person, or entity, could be liable even though he did not know the acts were infringing. In other words, even if the defendant reads the patent’s claims differently from the plaintiff, and that reading is reasonable, he would still be liable because he knew the acts might infringe. Global-Tech requires more. It requires proof the defendant knew the acts were infringing. And the Court’s opinion was clear in rejecting any lesser mental state as the standard.
Belief of Invalidity No Defense To Induced Infringement. The Supreme Court held that an accused infringer’s good faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to induced infringement for several reasons.
First, the Court held that infringement and validity are separate issues under the Patent Act. They are separately listed defenses as to liability such that “invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a defense to liability.”
Second, allowing belief as to validity as a defense to induced infringement would undermine the presumption of validity that “is a ‘common core of thought and truth'” and “that presumption would be lessened to a drastic degree.”
Third, maintaining the separation of infringement and validity is important in “the orderly administration of the patent system” given the different procedural burdens, presumptions and evidence attendant to each.
Fourth, an accused infringer who believes a patent is invalid has many other ways to defend itself by challenging patent validity in a declaratory judgment action, in an inter partes review or ex parte reexamination proceeding in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, or raising the defense in an infringement litigation.
Fifth, recognizing belief of invalidity as a defense to induced infringement would “render litigation more burdensome for everyone involved” including “increase[d] discovery costs and multiply[ing] the issues the jury must resolve” such that “the jury would be put to the difficult task of separating the defendant’s belief regarding validity from the actual issue of validity.”
Sixth, in other contexts the law recognizes that intentional acts can lead to liability “even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the law”, stating: “In the usual case, ‘I thought it was legal’ is no defense.” For similar reasons, belief that a patent is invalid “will not negate the scienter required under §271(b)”, which the court is limiting to knowledge that the patent is infringed.
Courts Should Dissuade Frivolous Cases. The Court made clear that there was no issue of frivolity in this case. But, as a nod to the current patent reform legislation efforts, the Court “stress[ed]” that districts “have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases are dissuaded.” The Court stated it was “well aware” of a developing patent licensing industry where some demand money even where their claims are frivolous:
The Court is well aware that an “industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees” [citing Justice Kennedy concurrence in eBay]. Some companies may use patents as a sword to go after defendants for money, even when their claims are frivolous. This tactic is often pursued through demand letters, which “may be sent very broadly and without prior investigation, may assert vague claims of infringement, and may be designed to obtain payments that are based more on the costs of defending litigation than on the merit of the patent claims.” [citing FTC Statement in 2014 on draft demand letter legislation]. This behavior can impose a “harmful tax on innovation.” [Id.]
The Court stated that this concern can be addressed using existing procedures for sanctioning attorneys for bringing frivolous cases, shifting attorney’s fees costs in “exceptional cases” and multiple avenues for an accused infringer to challenge patent validity, which thus favors maintaining the separation of infringement and validity, rather than conflating invalidity into a defense to induced infringement:
[I]t is still necessary and proper to stress that district courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases are dissuaded. If frivolous cases are filed in federal court, it is within the power of the court to sanction attorneys for bringing such suits. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. It is also within the district court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. §285; see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. __, __-__ (2014) (slip op., at 7-8). These safeguards, combined with the avenues that accused inducers have to obtain rulings on the validity of patents, militate in favor of maintaining the separation expressed throughout the Patent Act between infringement and validity. This dichotomy means that belief in invalidity is no defense to a claim of induced infringement.
As we previously reported, Cisco and Ruckus Wireless filed complaints against Innovative Wireless Solutions (IWS) in the Western District of Texas for declarations of non-infringement and invalidity of three of IWS’ patents allegedly covering WiFi technology. In their claim construction briefing, the parties disputed the meaning of the term “CSMA/CD”, which stands for “Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection.” The court issued a Markman claim construction opinion holding that IWS acted as its own lexicographer in the patents-in-suit by expressly referencing the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3 Ethernet standard’s definition of the term CSMA/CD. This term, therefore, was construed to incorporate the IEEE standard’s definition of it.
On Tuesday, the parties stipulated to a final judgment of non-infringement of IWS’ patent claims in light of the court’s claim construction ruling. The parties stipulated that the accused “communications path” associated with each accused product “complies with the IEEE 802.11 (g), (n) and/or (ac) amendments, (ii) is not wired, and (iii) does not ‘utiliz[e] twisted-pair wiring.’” “In particular, each Accused Product contains one or more radio transceivers (in connection with other circuitry) for communicating wirelessly with devices that are compliant with the IEEE 802.11 (g), (n) and/or (ac) protocols.” “IWS’s infringement contentions identify those wireless communications as satisfying the ‘bidirectional communications path’ and ‘communications path’ limitations.”
While the parties stipulated that the accused products practiced certain portions of the IEEE 802.11 standards, the parties nonetheless agreed that, in light of the Court’s claim construction ruling, the accused products
have not infringed and currently do not infringe the Asserted Claims of the Patents-in-Suit for at least the reason that the accused communications path associated with each Accused Product is not a ‘bidirectional communications path’ or ‘communications path’ ‘utilizing twisted-pair wiring that is too long to permit conventional 10BASE-T or similar LAN (Local Area Network) interconnections’.
Cisco, Ruckus and IWS, “therefore, stipulate[d] to entry of a final judgment that the Accused Products have not infringed and currently do not infringe the Asserted Claims of the Patents-in-Suit.”
IWS reserved the right to appeal the claim construction ruling. If IWS chooses to do so and it successfully challenges that ruling, the Federal Circuit may remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on claim construction or to determine whether Cisco or Ruckus’ products infringe IWS’ patents.
On Wednesday, the Court entered the final judgment pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
This case hihglights a few points that may arise when litigating standard essential patents. First, court’s may look to see whether disputed claim terms incorporate definitions from standards adopted by standard setting organizations (SSOs). Second, even in cases where the court finds that a disputed claim term incroporates a standard’s definition, and the alleged infringer agrees that its products practice that standard, there is still a possibility that the accused product does not infringe the patent.
The Western District of Texas recently held that patent holder Innovative Wireless Solutions (IWS) acted as its own lexicographer by expressly referencing the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3 Ethernet standard’s definition of a disputed claim term in the patents-in-suit. Therefore, the disputed claim was construed to incorporate the standard’s definition.
Background. Cisco and Ruckus Wireless both filed complaints against IWS seeking declarations of non-infringement and invalidity of three of IWS’ patents allegedly covering WiFi technology. Cisco’s complaint alleges that IWS is a “patent assertion entity that, on information and belief, has been set up to monetize patents by filing strike suits against mere end users of 802.11 standard compliant products (also known as Wi-Fi products) for the purpose of obtaining licensing and settlement amounts to which they are not entitled.” “[R]ather than seek to license its patents to Cisco and other manufactures of Wi-Fi compliant products, IWS instead sent demand letters to end users that have purchased Cisco products that are compliant with the Wi-Fi standards.” According to Cisco, “[w]ithin one week of sending the letters, IWS filed 41 lawsuits against these end users of Cisco products and other similar parties.” “In turn, Cisco received indemnity demands from a number of these purchasers.” “Although the 41 lawsuits were dismissed without prejudice,” Cisco claims that “IWS is intent on re-filing these lawsuits against these retail purchasers after correcting one or more procedural deficiencies.” Cisco therefore filed suit “to protect the purchasers” of its WiFi compliant products.
Ruckus’ complaint makes similar allegations and, like Cisco, requests a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity to protect purchasers of its WiFi compliant products.
IWS filed answers generally denying the substantive allegations of both complaints but admitting that a case or controversy existed for purposes of Cisco and Ruckus’ request for declaratory relief. IWS also counterclaimed for infringement of the three patents against both Cisco and Ruckus.
The disputed claim term. The term “CSMA/CD” appears in claims in all three of the IWS patents at issue. This stands for “Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection.” The parties disputed whether the term needed to be construed at all. In their claim construction brief, Cisco and Ruckus argued that CSMA/CD is a well-known protocol defined by the IEEE 802.3 Working Group and that IWS’ patents defer to the published IEEE standard. Therefore, a skilled artisan at the time of the patent would understand the use of the term CSMA/CD and no construction was necessary.
IWS, on the other hand, argued that “CSMA/CD is a term the jury cannot readily understand” and requested that the court construe it to mean:
Techniques compatible with connecting to networks such as Ethernet networks, where a device that wishes to transmit on the network listens and checks to see if the channel is free for sending data. If the channel is not free, or if a collision is detected during transmission, the device waits for a small amount of time and tries again.
IWS contended that its proposed construction was “supported by the specification and the IEEE 802.3 standard.” Specifically, IWS cited to one sentence in the specification that states: “The term CSMA/CD is used herein to refer generically to this technology.” IWS argued that “this sentence indicates that CSMA/CD is used throughout the patents-in-suit to describe any network technology that employs a contention scheme similar to the 802.3 scheme.” IWS asserted further that “the contention scheme contained in its proposed construction is consistent with the contention scheme overview in the 802.3 standard.” Finally, IWS contended that the “MA” in CSMA/CD “shows that CSMA/CD is a technology that relates to connecting to a network” and that “multiple access” shows “that the technology relates to connecting to networks in addition to facilitating communications.”
The court’s ruling. The court rejected IWS’ proposed construction as well as Cisco and Ruckus’ position that the term required no construction. “In light of the clear language contained in the patents’ specification, the court concludes that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and specifically defined the term’s use in the context of the patents.” The court relied on the specification, which defines CSMA/CD as follows:
Different technologies can be used to facilitate communications on any LAN [Local Area Network] and throughout the Network, the most common being . . . (CSMA/CD) technology. This is documented in IEEE Standard 802.3 . . . The 802.3 Standard is based on the 1985 Version 2 Standard for Ethernet and, although there are some differences . . . the two Standards are largely interchangeable and can be considered equivalent as far as this invention is concerned. The term ‘CSMA/CD’ is used herein to refer generically to this technology. Using CSMA/CD, packets of data are communicated in frames that are generally referred to as Ethernet frames. This term is also used herein, regardless of whether the frames comply with the 802.3 Standard or Ethernet Standard . . .
In other words, “CSMA/CD is a technology, documented in the IEEE 802.3 standard, used to facilitate network communications” and “[t]he 802.3 standard is based on the 1985 Version 2 Standard for Ethernet (‘Ethernet 2 Standard’).” The court held that “[a]s far as this invention is concerned, the two standards are equivalent.” “In the patents-in-suit, CSMA/CD is used to generically refer to the technology as defined in either standard.” “Moreover, the specification references the documented IEEE standard when describing a network technology that uses CSMA/CD.” “The specification further references the IEEE standard when describing the contention scheme employed in CSMA/CD.”
According to the court, “Cisco’s argument that the term should be given its ordinary and customary meaning fails.” While there “is a heavy presumption that the term carries its ordinary and customary meaning,” the “presumption is overcome when the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term.”
The court also rejected IWS’ proposed construction. IWS’ “relies on the use of ‘generically’ in the specification to argue for a particularly broad interpretation.” “However, within the context of the paragraph, the word generically refers to CSMA/CD as defined in either the 802.3 Standard or the Ethernet 2 Standard.” “As the patents-in-suit explain, the two standards are interchangeable and equivalent as far as this invention is concerned.”
The court therefore construed the term CSMA/CD to incorporate the definition in the standard: “CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection) as defined in either the IEEE 802.3 Standard or the 1985 Version 2 Standard for Ethernet.”
Thus, litigants should also be mindful that the definition of patent claim terms may be impacted by a patent’s reference to definitions of claim terms in industry standards.
Today in Commil v. Cisco the Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to review the following specific question presented:
Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant’s belief that a patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
We provided a summary of the underlying Federal Circuit decision in our June 25, 2013 post.
The Northern District of California recently granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of patent-plaintiff ChriMar Systems, Inc. on antitrust and state law unfair competition counterclaims filed by accused infringers Cisco and Hewlett-Packard (HP). According to the court, the crux of Cisco’s and HP’s counterclaims alleged that ChriMar failed to disclose and commit to license one of its patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms during a standard-setting process and, subsequent to the standard being adopted, filed suit against them alleging infringement of the same patent. Cisco and HP alleged that this was an abuse ChriMar’s “monopoly power” and also a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. The court held that judgment on the pleadings was warranted because Cisco and HP failed to define the relevant market and also failed to plead facts showing market power and antitrust injury. The court, however, granted Cisco and HP leave to amend their counterclaims.
Background. On October 31, 2011, ChriMar filed a complaint against Cisco and HP alleging that Cisco’s and HP’s “Power over Ethernet telephones, switches, wireless access points, routers and other devices used in wireless local area networks, and/or cameras and components thereof that are compliant with the” Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.3af and/or 802.3at standards infringed one or more claims of ChriMar’s U.S. Patent No. 7,457,250 (“the ‘250 Patent”). In response, Cisco and HP filed counterclaims asserting causes of action for, inter alia, monopolization under the federal antitrust laws as well as for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law.
In their counterclaims, Cisco and HP allege that the IEEE has a “patent disclosure policy” that “requires participants in the standards setting process to disclose patents or patent applications they believe to be infringed by the practice of the proposed standard.” Cisco and HP further allege that the IEEE policy requires those who disclose intellectual property rights to provide a written assurance stating whether they would enforce any of their present or future patents “whose use would be required to implement the proposed IEEE standard or provide” a license to such patents royalty-free or on RAND terms. The counterclaims assert that ChriMar was required to but intentionally “failed to disclose to IEEE its belief that its ‘250 Patent was essential to the proposed 802.3af and/or the 802.3at” during amendments of the 802.3 standard and that “ChriMar was not willing to license the ‘250 Patent on RAND terms.” Cisco and HP contend that due, in part, to this alleged failure to disclose, the industry adopted the present form of IEEE 802.3af and IEEE 802.3at amendments to the IEEE 802.3 standard and that they are now “locked-in to the current implementation . . . for Power over Ethernet-enabled products.” Had ChriMar disclosed its belief that the ‘250 Patent would be infringed by practicing the proposed amendments to the 802.3 standard as well as its unwillingness to license the patent on royalty-free or RAND terms, the IEEE would have, according to Cisco and HP, done one or more of the following:
1. Incorporated one or more viable alternative technologies into the IEEE 802.3af and IEEE 802.3at amendments to the IEEE 802.3 standard;
2. Requested ChriMar to provide a letter of assurance that it would license the ‘250 Patent on RAND terms;
3. Decided to either not adopt any amendment to the IEEE 802.3; and/or
4. Adopted an amendment that did not incorporate technology that ChriMar claims is covered by the ‘250 Patent.
Cisco and HP further contend that ChriMar has taken the position that all Power over Ethernet-enabled products infringe the ‘250 Patent and that, to the extent that the ‘250 Patent is essential to the 802.3af and the 802.3at standards, no viable technology substitutes exist and ChriMar has monopoly power over the Power over Ethernet Technology Market. Both Cisco and HP allege that this conduct combined with ChriMar’s infringement action against them is an unlawful abuse of monopoly power under Section 2 of the Federal Sherman Antitrust Act and also unfair competition under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. Code § 17200 (UCL).
HP also filed a claim for attempted monopolization under Section 2, which alleges that ChriMar’s complaint against it, Cisco and several others (Respondents) before the International Trade Commission seeking an exclusion order under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 constituted an unlawful intent to monopolize the Power over Ethernet Technology market. According to HP, ChriMar alleged before the ITC that Respondents infringe the ‘250 Patent by importing products that practice the Power over Ethernet Standards IEEE 802.3af and 802.3at. HP alleges that the Respondents’ imports collectively “comprise the substantial majority of products commercially offered in the Power over Ethernet Technology Market.” HP alleges further that ChriMar’s “baseless” allegations of infringement and request for an order prohibiting these Respondents from importing Power over Ethernet products constitutes an unlawful attempt to monopolize the Power over Ethernet Technology Market.
ChriMar’s Answers and Motion to Dismiss. ChriMar filed an answer to Cisco’s counterclaims as well as an answer to HP’s counterclaims generally denying defendants’ antitrust and UCL allegations and asserting lack of standing and failure to state a claim as affirmative defenses. ChriMar thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings on the antitrust and UCL counterclaims. In its motion, ChriMar argued that Cisco and HP failed to plead facts showing that ChriMar had monopoly power in the alleged relevant market. Specifically, according to ChriMar, Defendants could not “simply rely on the existence of patent rights or actions to enforce them, as they have done.” “As a matter of law, ‘patent rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of that word’ … and simply owning or enforcing the patent right does not make one a ‘prohibited monopolist.'” ChriMar elaborated:
While the patent may give its owner a right to exclude, that is in no way synonymous with having monopoly power. … Such is presumably the case in a market related to a standards setting context where the standard does not practice the patented technology as Defendants allege in this action, where there are market alternatives to the standard itself such as Cisco’s own proprietary inline power technology, where other parties have rights to exclude in the same technology market (in the form of other patents that read on the standards) and can effectively limit the ability of other parties to exert monopoly power (i.e., control prices), or where competing technologies like wireless communication or conventional unpowered Ethernet can exert economic influences that can keep Power over Ethernet prices or the exercise of monopoly power in check — all issues Defendants’ pleadings never address.
ChriMar further argued that its enforcement of its patent rights was presumed to be valid under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which generally grants immunity from antitrust liability for petitioning the government in the form of litigation. To overcome this presumption, Cisco and HP had to plead facts showing that its litigation against them and ITC proceeding seeking an exclusion order were a “sham,” that is, “objectively baseless.” To be objectively baseless, Cisco and HP must plead facts showing that ChriMar’s claims were “‘so baseless that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to secure favorable relief.'” If Cisco and HP could show that ChriMar’s claims were objectively baseless, they next had to allege facts showing that the litigation was subjectively brought in bad faith in order to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity.
ChriMar argued that the only factual allegation in HP’s counterclaim is that “‘discovery in the ITC investigation established that ChriMar’s allegations for domestic industry were baseless'” and that “ChriMar withdrew its [ITC] complaint nine months after it was filed, and after HP filed a motion for summary determination on the issue of domestic market.” These allegations, according to ChriMar, failed to overcome ChriMar’s Noerr-Pennington immunity.
ChriMar also argued that Defendants failed to plead facts adequately defining a relevant market, a necessary element for a Section 2 claim. Defendants alleged the following relevant market in their counterclaims:
ChriMar actually, potentially, and/or purportedly competes in the United States and worldwide markets for developing and licensing technology essential to implement the IEEE 802.3af and 802.3at amendments to the IEEE 802.3 standard and for technology essential to perform certain functions, allegedly covered by the ‘250 Patent, necessary to implement the IEEE 802.3 standard (hereinafter ‘Power over Ethernet Technology Market’).
ChriMar asserted that this definition is flawed because it fails to identify what particular technologies are included within the market. Further, ChriMar argued that Defendants “have pled a market whose outer boundaries are defined by ChriMar’s infringement claims (one patent asserted against two standards) rather than any exploration of the ‘reasonable interchangeability’ of use or the cross-elasticity of demand’ outside this intersection.” Cisco and HP’s counterclaims did not consider that the “technologies and products at issue in this litigation may be interchangeable with other technologies and products such as Power over-Ethernet technologies and products that are not compliant with the two standards . . . or even technologies and products not compliant with any standard, but that themselves are alternatives to the Power over Ethernet technologies and products compliant with these two standards.” Under the Sherman Act, according to ChriMar, the relevant market cannot be defined by ChriMar’s economic power within the two standards. Rather, the relevant market must be defined and measured by cross-elasticity of demand or product interchangeability: “Here, Defendants plead economic power with respect to those entities voluntarily choosing to continue making products compliant with these two particular standards . . . and not the market demand for these particular Power over Ethernet technologies themselves.”
ChriMar further argued that Cisco and HP failed to plead facts showing that ChriMar had monopoly power or that Defendants have suffered antitrust injury. Further, ChriMar asserted that HP’s attempted monopolization claim was deficient because it failed to plead facts showing that ChriMar’s ITC action “was motivated by an intent to monopolize, rather than primarily motivated by legitimate business purposes.” Finally, ChriMar argued that Cisco and HP’s UCL claims should be dismissed because they relied on the same conduct that formed the basis of their Section 2 claims.
Cisco and HP’s Opposition. Cisco filed an opposition to ChriMar’s motion, as did HP. Responding to ChriMar’s arguments that Defendants failed to adequately plead a relevant market, both Cisco and HP argued that “[m]arket definition is rarely grounds for dismissal of a pleading because ‘the validity of the relevant market is typically a factual element rather than a legal element” that is not appropriate to resolve on a Rule 12 motion.
On the merits, Defendants argued that numerous cases have consistently held “that the relevant market is defined by those technologies that — before the standard was adopted — were competing to perform the function that was covered by the purportedly essential patent.” According to Cisco and HP, “ChriMar does not cite to a single case that considered the relevant market where antitrust violations occurred in connection with misconduct in the context of standards development.” In contrast, Defendants argued that Apple v. Samsung, Broadcom v. Qualcomm and Apple v. Motorola confirm that their market definition was adequately pled. In Samsung, Apple pled the relevant market as “the various markets for technologies that — before the standard was implemented — were competing to perform each of the various functions covered by each of Samsung’s purported essential patents for UMTS.” “Apple also identified the patents Samsung declared as standard essential and alleged that ‘pre-standardization there existed alternative substitutes for the technologies covered by Samsung’s patents,’ and that after standardization, ‘viable alternative technologies were excluded.'” Defendants asserted that the Samsung court found such allegations to “define the bounds of the relevant market” and that “Apple ha[d] sufficiently pled a relevant antitrust market” because “the incorporation of a patent into a standard . . . makes the scope of the relevant market congruent with that of the patent.”
According to Defendants, the Broadcom court reached a similar conclusion, holding that Broadcom, the alleged infringer, had adequately pled a relevant market to support a monopolization claim that was defined as “the market for Qualcomm’s proprietary WCDMA technology, a technology essential to the implementation of the UMTS standard.” Apple v. Motorola reached a similar conclusion, finding that a relevant market was sufficiently pled as “the various technologies competing to perform the functions covered by Motorola’s declared-essential patents for each of the relevant standards.”
Cisco and HP argued that, “[c]onsistent with these cases, [Defendants] defined the market to comprise the technologies that competed to perform the functions in the [Power over Ethernet] Standards allegedly covered by the ‘250 patent.” This definition, according to Defendants, “appropriately focuses on alternative technologies that were excluded from the market by ChriMar’s deceptive conduct and which [Defendants] and other implementers of the standard cannot now choose because the industry is ‘locked-in’ to the standard.” “To the extent ChriMar argues the correct market definition should include the entire standard, rather than some portion of the standard, that argument is inconsistent with both the complaint and with” Samsung, Broadcom, and Apple.
With respect to monopoly power, both Cisco and HP argued that in the standards context, “it is well settled that patentees holding standard-essential patents can possess monopoly power.” Cisco and HP again relied upon Samsung, wherein the court concluded that “because standard-essential patents may confer antitrust market power on the patent owner, Apple’s claims” that “Samsung had market power over the relevant market because it obtained the power to raise prices and exclude competition over the technologies covered by Samsung’s standard-essential patents” and that “there was a ‘lock-in’ to the standard” were sufficient to plead monopoly power. Cisco and HP argued that their counterclaims satisfied this standard because they alleged that, as a result of ChriMar’s accusations that “the leading vendors of Power over Ethernet-enabled products” infringe the ‘250 Patent, “it is ChriMar’s position that no meaningful level of Power over Ethernet-enabled products do not infringe the ‘250 Patent.” Further, like the allegations in Samsung, Cisco and HP both allege that “because of ‘lock-in’ to the standard,” there are no “viable technology substitutes at present.” “Accordingly, if the ‘250 Patent claims covered products that comply with the IEEE standard as claimed by ChriMar, ChriMar has monopoly power over the Power over Ethernet Technology Market.”
The element of antitrust injury was also adequately pled, according to Cisco and HP. Defendants argued that in order to plead that they have suffered antitrust injury, they must allege facts showing an injury to competition. “It is well settled that misconduct before an SSO harms competition by ‘obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder.'” Cisco and HP pointed to allegations in their counterclaims “concerning the harm to competition caused by ChriMar’s deception in the context of standards setting,” including that ChriMar “‘could charge supra-competitive prices”‘” and that “‘[c]ustomers and consumers will be harmed, either by not getting products that are compliant with the IEEE 802.af and IEEE 802.at amendment to the IEEE 802.3 standard or having to pay an exorbitant price for one.”
Cisco also took issue with ChriMar’s argument that “the anticompetitive harm alleged by Cisco ‘is a potential consequence in any successful patent litigation.'” According to Cisco, “[t]his is not just ‘ any patent litigation,’ and the competitive harm alleged by Cisco is not the natural result of any litigation.” “[H]ere, ChriMar deliberately subverted the goals of the IEEE standards-setting process by not disclosing its patent rights, waiting until the industry became ‘locked-in’ to the [Power over Ethernet] Standards, and demanding royalties from implementers of the standards that Cisco has alleged will lead to ‘supra-competitive prices.'”
With respect to ChriMar’s Noerr-Pennington argument, Cisco argued that “[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply to monopoly power gained through deception in the context of SSOs, even when an allegedly standard-essential patent is subsequently asserted in court.” As the doctrine does not apply, Cisco and HP need not plead facts supporting the two exceptions.
HP argued similarly, but also asserted that its counterclaim alleged facts supporting the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington, that is is, that ChriMar filed a sham ITC proceeding against HP and others only to later voluntarily withdraw it.
HP also asserted that its counterclaims adequately pled that ChriMar had a specific intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of obtaining a monopoly. “HP alleges facts that ChriMar deceitfully concealed its patent in connection with the IEEE standards-setting process and then sought to enforce its patent in the ITC. This conduct shows a specific intent by ChriMar to monopolize the [Power over Ethernet] Technology Market through its anticompetitive conduct.” “ChriMar became dangerously close to succeeding in its attempt, having dismissed its complaint less than two months before the start of the ITC hearing.”
Finally, Cisco and HP argued that, because they adequately pled causes of action under the federal antitrust laws, they also adequately pled a cause of action under California’s UCL.
The Court’s Decision on Cisco and HP’s Monopolization Counterclaims. After ChriMar filed its reply, the court entered an order granting ChriMar’s motion. With respect to Cisco and HP’s monopolization claims, the court agreed with ChriMar that their pleadings failed to allege facts sufficient to define the relevant market, a necessary element to a Section 2 claim. “Courts typically require that the proposed relevant market be defined with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand.” “However, in the context of a standard setting organization (‘SSO’) locking in a standard which eliminates substitute or alternative technologies courts have allowed a relevant market to be defined by the technologies that were competing before the standard was adopted to perform the function that is covered by the standard and the essential patent.” “For example, in [Apple v. Samsung], the court found sufficient Apple’s allegations that defined the relevant market as the ‘various markets for technologies that — before the standard was implemented — were competing to perform each of the various functions covered by each of Samsung’s purported essential patents for’ the standard.” The court in Samsung further “noted that Apple alleged that pre-standardization there were alternative substitutes for the technologies covered by Samsung’s patents, and that after the SSO adopted the proposed standard, viable alternative technologies were excluded.” Cisco and HP’s claims failed to plead such facts or facts defining the market “as comprising the technologies that competed to perform the functions in the Power over Ethernet standards allegedly covered by the ‘250 Patent.” Therefore, Cisco and HP failed to sufficiently allege the relevant market.
The court also held that Cisco and HP failed to allege sufficient facts showing that ChriMar had the requisite market power to support a Section 2 claim. On this element, Cisco and HP argued that “their allegations regarding ChriMar’s failure to disclose its belief that the ‘250 Patent was essential to the 802.3af and 802.3at amendments to the IEEE 802.3 to the standard setting organization (‘SSO’) is sufficient to allege their monopoly claims.” Citing to an earlier decision in Apple v. Samsung, Defendants contended that “it is sufficient to allege that if the ‘250 Patent is essential, then ChriMar has monopoly power.” The court, however, concluded that the decision did not support defendants’ contention. Specifically, “in that case, the court determined that Apple had sufficiently alleged monopoly power.” “The court in Samsung further noted that, in contrast to the theory that a patent holder misrepresented to an SSO that it would license its intellectual property on RAND terms, ‘[c]ourts have been more reluctant to find an antitrust violation based on the theory that a failure to disclose intellectual property rights in a declared essential patent created monopoly power for a member of the SSO.'” Indeed, the Samsung court expressly required the plaintiff to allege that “there was an alternative technology that the SSO was considering during the standard setting process and that the SSO would have adopted an alternative standard had it known of the patent holder’s intellectual property rights.” The Samsung court further made it “clear that the heightened pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) for fraud applies to” the types of antitrust claims brought by Cisco and HP. Applying these standards to those claims, the court concluded that “they fail to allege non-conclusory facts which, if true, would be enough to show that ChriMar acquired sufficient monopoly power.” “Notably, Defendants fail to clearly allege that the IEEE would have adopted an alternative standard had it known about the ‘250 Patent and ChriMar’s position with respect to its ‘250 Patent.” Therefore, Cisco and HP failed to plead the necessary element of market power.
Finally, with respect to the necessary element of antitrust injury, the court concluded that Cisco and HP’s claims merely alleged, “in conclusory fashion, that ChriMar’s alleged conduct has ’caused and will directly and proximately cause antitrust liability to [Defendants] within the Power over Ethernet Technology Market . . .” Neither defendant pled any facts which, if true, “would demonstrate antitrust injury.”
Because Cisco and HP failed to allege the necessary elements of a relevant market, monopoly power, and antitrust injury, the court found “that Defendants have not alleged sufficient facts to state a counterclaim for monopolization.” However, the court provided Defendants with leave to amend their monopolization claims in an attempt to remedy the deficiencies identified by the court.
Notably, the court did not address — at least not at this time — ChriMar’s Noerr-Pennington arguments but may very well do so on any subsequent motion to dismiss the amended counterclaims permitted by the court’s decision.
The Court’s Decision on HP’s Attempted Monopolization Counterclaim. Because HP failed to plead a relevant market as well as antitrust injury, HP’s attempted monopolization claim failed as well. “In addition, although a lower percentage [of market share] is required for an attempted monopoly claim, as opposed to an actual monopoly claim, HP must still allege sufficient market power.” The court concluded that HP failed to allege sufficient market power which was also “fatal to its attempted monopolization claim.”
The court disagreed with ChriMar’s argument that “HP’s attempted monopolization counterclaim fails for the additional reason that HP fails to allege specific intent to monopolize or a dangerous probability of obtaining monopoly power because HP’s attempted monopolization allegations are based solely around the terminated [ITC] investigation.” The court concluded that “HP does not rely solely upon the ITC investigation” but “is also premised upon ChriMar’s alleged misconduct before the SSO.” However, because the court was granting HP leave to amend its counterclaim to adequately allege a relevant market, market power and antitrust injury, the court did not reach the issue of whether HP’s additional allegations regarding the ITC investigation would be sufficient, standing alone, to state a claim for attempted monopolization “if HP sufficiently alleges the relevant market power, and an antitrust injury.” HP’s attempted monopolization claim was therefore dismissed with leave to amend.
The Court’s Decision on Cisco and HP’s UCL Counterclaims. The court also dismissed Cisco and HP’s UCL counterclaims. “Courts have held that where the alleged conduct does not violate the antitrust laws, a claim based on unfair conduct under the UCL cannot survive.” “Because the Court finds that Defendants have not alleged facts sufficient to state a a counterclaim for monopolization and attempted monopolization, Defendants’ UCL counterclaims” fail as well. However, as with the other counterclaims, the court granted HP and Cisco leave to amend this claim as well.
We will continue to track the pleading and other developments in this case.
Yesterday, in Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, No. 2013-1489, the Federal Circuit ruled that an expert’s damages testimony was not admissible. The court’s ruling provides guidance on underlying circumstances required to establish a royalty base and a royalty rate as well as questions the viability of using the Nash Bargaining Solution’s 50/50 split of profits between the patent owner and infringer as a starting point to establish a reasonable royalty.
The patents concern technology for providing security over networks, such as the Internet. Patent owner VirnetX accused Apple of infringing two patents based on the “FaceTime” feature provided on Apple’s iPhone, iPod, iPad and Mac computers. VirnetX accused Apple of infringing two other patents based on its “VPN On Demand” feature in the iPhone, iPad and iPod Touch. A jury returned a verdict that all asserted claims were valid and infringed, and awarded about $368 million reasonable royalty damages.
During the trial, the patent owner’s damages expert presented three reasonable royalty theories.
- First Theory. His first theory applied a 1% royalty to the lowest sale price of each accused device to arrive at $708 million royalty. The 1% amount was based on the patent owner’s “policy of seeking to license its patents for at least 1-2% of the entire value of products sold” as well as allegedly comparable licenses.
- Second Theory. His second theory was applied to FaceTime products using the Nash Bargaining Solution to start at a 50/50 split of profits between the patent owner and accused infringer and then using factors to modify that approach to give the patent owner 45% of the profit. This led to a $588 million royalty.
- Third Theory. His third theory also applied the Nash Bargaining Solution against FaceTime products, but claimed that FaceTime “drove sales” of Apple’s iOS products based on a customer survey asserting that 18% of those sales would not have occurred without the addition of FaceTime to the device. Using the same Nash 50/50 split of profits starting point, the expert attributed 45% of the profits to the patent owner yielding $5.13 per unit royalty that totaled $606 million royalty.
The Federal Circuit started by explaining that, “[n]o matter what the form of the royalty, a patentee must take care to seek only those damages attributable to the infringing features.” The court instructed that apportionment generally applied for claims drawn to an individual component of a multi-component product:
Thus, when claims are drawn to an individual component of a multi-component product, it is the exception, not the rule, that damages may be based upon the value of the multi-component product. Indeed, we recently reaffirmed that “[a] patentee may assess damages based on the entire market value of the accused product only where the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand or substantially creates the value of the component parts.” In the absence of such a showing, principles of apportionment apply.
These strict requirements limiting the entire market value exception ensure that a reasonably royalty “does not overreach and encompass components not covered by the patent.” Thus, “[i]t is not enough to merely show that the [patented feature] is viewed as valuable, important, or even essential to the use of the [overall product].” Instead, this court has consistently held that “a reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to … carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place.” Additionally, we have also cautioned against reliance on the entire market value of the accused products because it “cannot help but skew the damages horizon from the jury, regardless of the contribution of the patented component to this revenue.”
Jury Instructions on Entire Unit as Royalty Base. In this case, the Federal Circuit took issue with the jury instruction that, “[i]n determining a royalty base, you should not use the value of the entire apparatus or product unless either: … (2) the product in question constitutes the smallest saleable unit containing the patented feature.” This instruction was wrong because it “mistakenly suggests that when the smallest salable unit is used as the royalty base, there is necessarily no further constraint on the selection of the base.” The smallest salable patent-practicing unit is a “step toward meeting the requirement of apportionment”, but more apportioning is required if such a unit is a multi-component product:
Where the smallest salable unit is, in fact, a multi-component product containing several non-infringing features with no relation to the patented feature (as [patent owner] VirnetX claims it was here), the patentee must do more to estimate what portion of the value of that product is attributable to the patented technology.
Expert’s First Approach. The Federal Circuit agreed that the patent owner’s expert’s testimony should have been excluded because it “relied on the entire market value of Apple’s products without demonstrating that the patented features drove the demand for those products.” In this case, the expert “did not even attempt to substract any other unpatented elements from the base, which therefore included various features indisputably not claimed by VirnetX, e.g., touchscreen, camera, processor, speaker, and microphone, to name but a few.” Where the patented feature does not drive demand for the product, apportionment is required regardless whether the patented feature is “viewed as valuable, important, or even essential,” the Federal Circuit stating:
[A] patentee must be reasonable (though may be approximate) when seeking to identify a patent-practicing unit, tangible or intangible, with a close relation to the patented feature. In the end, [patent owner] VirnetX should have identified a patent-practicing feature with a sufficiently close relation to the claimed functionality. The law requires patentees to apportion the royalty down to a reasonable estimate of the value of its claimed technology, or else establish that its patented technology drove demand for the entire product. VirnetX did neither.
The expert’s testimony should have been excluded here, because he “did not even try to link demand for the accused device to the patented feature, and failed to apportion value between the patented features and the vast number of non-patented features contained in the accused products.”
The Federal Circuit, however, did not find error in admitting the 1% royalty rate portion of the expert’s testimony based on comparable licenses. In this case, four of the alleged comparable licenses related to the actual patents-in-suit, the others were drawn to related technology and “all of the other differences that Apple complains of were presented to the jury”:
[T]hough there were undoubtedly differences between the licenses at issue and the circumstances of the hypothetical negotiation, “[t]he jury was entitled to hear the expert testimony and decide for itself what to accept or reject.”
Expert’s Nash Bargaining Solution Theories. The Federal Circuit agreed that the expert’s using the Nash Bargaining Solution 50/50 split as a starting point was akin to the rejected “25 percent rule of thumb” and could not be relied upon “without sufficiently establishing that the premises of the theorem actually apply to the facts of the case at hand”:
The Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain set of premises. It itself asserts nothing about what situations in the real world fit those premises. Anyone seeking to invoke the theorem as applicable to a particular situation must establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-split result is proven by the theorem only on those premises. [Patent owner’s expert] did not do so.
The key problem here was starting with the 50/50 split with no basis to do so in this case and then trying to adjust it based on the circumstances of the case, which high starting point could skew a jury’s verdict:
[E]ven if an expert could identify all of the factors that would cause negotiating parties to deviate from the 50/50 baseline in a particular case, the use of this methodology would nevertheless run the significant risk of inappropriately skewing the jury’s verdict. This same concern underlies our rule that a patentee may not balance out an unreasonably high royalty base simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate. … [H]ere, the use of a 50/50 starting point–itself unjustified by evidence about the particular facts–provides a baseline from which juries might hesitate to stray, even if the evidence supported a radically different split.
In sum, the expert’s failure to first establish the required premises of the Nash Bargaining Solution are met in this case to justify starting with a 50/50 split rendered that testimony inadmissible even though the expert attempted to adjust that 50/50 split it started with based on the circumstances of the case.
Last week, following a bench trial in CSIRO v. Cisco, Judge Davis in E.D. Texas determined a reasonable royalty damages award for a CSIRO patent stipulated to be valid, infringed and essential to several versions of the IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard where a RAND-obligation applied to one version of the standard, but not others. The patent owner CSIRO sought a per-end product reasonable royalty of about $30 million. Cisco argued a per WiFi chip reasonable royalty of about $1.1 million. Judge Davis rejected both damages models, found the patent to play a “significant role” in the success of 802.11 products, and derived his own per-end-product reasonable royalty damages award of about $16 million.
This is the third bench trial decision to determine a royalty rate for a standard essential patent (the other two were Judge Robart’s Microsoft v. Motorola decision and Judge Holderman’s Innovatio decision). This case differs, because this royalty rate was determined in the context of past infringement damages, rather than setting a RAND-royalty rate per se. Further, although the patent was essential to the standard, no RAND-obligation applied to almost all of the accused infringement because the patent owner gave the IEEE a letter of assurance RAND-commitment as to only revision “a” of the standard and refused IEEE request to give such a commitment for later versions of the standard.
Patent owner Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Orginasation (“CSIRO”) is the principal scientific research organization for the Austrialian Federal Government. The patent-in-suit addresses multipath problems in a wireless local area network. That technology was incorporated into certain versions of the IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard, including revision “a” adopted in 1999 and revision “g” adopted in 2003. In December 1998, before IEEE adopted revision “a”, CSIRO provided the IEEE with a letter of assurance that it would license the specific patent-in-suit on RAND-terms if the patent were essential to the 802.11a standard. IEEE sought additional letters of assurance from CSIRO for later revisions of the standard, but CSIRO declined to provide them.
In 2003, CSIRO offered industry participants a license on RAND terms on all versions of the standard (at first indicating that it had agreed with IEEE to do so, but later clarifying there was no RAND obligation). By June 2004, CSIRO developed a Voluntary Licensing Program offering licenses to the ‘069 Patent under “a flat-fee royalty, charged per end product unit sold.”
A company called Radiata Communications (“Radiata”) was formed by the named inventor, CSIRO and others to commercialize the patented technology. Radiata employed various CSIRO employees as well as another named inventor. CSIRO entered a Technology License Agreement (TLA) with Radiata in February 1998 that, among other things, had a per-WiFi chip royalty payment. In 2001, Cisco acquired Radiata and started paying Radiata’s license fees under the TLA license agreement for Radiata products. This agreement was renogotiated several times, always keeping the general concept of a per-chip royalty base.
In July 2011, CSIRO sued Cisco for infringing the patent-in-suit. Both parties stipulated to a bench trial solely on damages and that Cisco would not challenge the patent’s infringement or validity.
Judge Davis’s Ruling
Cisco’s Estoppel Affirmative Defense (Denied). The court denied Cisco’s affirmative defense that legal and equitable estoppel should limit damages. The elements of these defenses were summarized as follows:
To establish a defense of equitable estoppel, Cisco must demonstrate that: (1) CSIRO communicated something in a misleading way by words, conduct, or silence; (2) Cisco relied upon that communication; and (3) Cisco would be materially harmed if CSIRO is allowed to assert any claim inconsistent with its earlier communication. Legal estoppel requires that CSIRO granted Cisco certain rights, received consideration for those rights, and then sought to derogate from the righs granted.
Cisco argued that CSIRO’s RAND commitment precluded CSIRO from seeking damages from Cisco higher than the LTA royalty rate that CSIRO gave to Radiata on the same patent. The parties agreed that RAND commitment applied to the 802.11a version of the standard. But CSIRO argued that the revision “a” RAND-commitment does not extend to Cisco because Cisco never made a written request for a license. Judge Davis agreed with Cisco that this written requirement was met based on the course of dealings between Cisco and CSIRO. Thus. a RAND obligation applied to 802.11a products.
But that was not the case for later revisions of 802.11 (g, n and ac). IEEE asked CSIRO to provide letters of assurance for these later versions, but CSIRO declined to do so. Judge Davis found that CSIRO actually made no RAND commitment to IEEE or its members for “g” or later revisions of the standard: “Therefore, while CSIRO was free to offer licenses on RAND terms as to products practicing these revisions, it was not contractually obligated to do so.” He found no RAND-license was consummated and, “[r]egardless … the parties would have sought a royalty that each believed accurately valued the ‘069 Patent”, stating:
Because CSIRO provided no letter of assurance creating a binding RAND obligation, and because any voluntary offer by CSIRO to license the ‘069 Patent technology on RAND terms was rejected, was withdrawn, or lapsed, CSIRO has no RAND obligation to Cisco as to 802.11g, 802.11n, or 802.11ac products. Regardless of CSIRO’s RAND commitment, at the hypothetical negotiations the parties would have sought a royalty that each believed accurately valued the ‘069 Patent.
Thus, Cisco’s legal and equitable estoppel defense did not apply except for products practicing revision “a” of the 802.11 standard, which would require RAND licensing terms.
CSIRO’s Damages Model (Rejected). CSIRO argued that the end product devices (network interface cards, routers, access points) were the smallets saleable patent practicing unit. CSIRO also argued that its patent provides the only “improved benefits” between revisions of the standard covered by the patent and other revisions; therefore, the difference in profit margins between covered and not-covered products “largely represents the value attributable to the ‘069 Patent.” But, among other things, Judge Davis found a “fundamental problem” in the large disperity in profit margins between covered and non-covered products– over $84 difference for consumer products and over $200 difference for enterprise products; that disparity made it “impossible to reliably determine where the value of the patented technology lies.” The expert also had problems in apportioning value to the patented technology distinct from unpatented features. For example, “802.11g is backwards compatible with 802.11b, a feature not specfically attributable to the ‘069 Patent, but which adds value to the consumer” not accounted for in CSIRO’s damages model. Further, the expert’s resultant oyalty was higher than the royalty CSIRO offered in its Voluntary Licensing Program. Thus, the court “attributes little weight” to CSIRO’s damages model.
Cisco’s Damages Model (Rejected). Cisco argued that the royalty should be based on WiFi chip prices capped at the royalty rate that CSIRO gave Radiata under the TLA agreement between them, where the inventive concept resides in the chip. Judge Davis rejected Cisco’s licensing model because it relied primarily on the TLA agreement, which was a unique agreement given the relationship between CSIRO and its business partner Radiato that was not comparable to the hypothetical negotiation for CSIRO-Cisco license. Rather, “[t]he connection between CSIRO and Radiata created a special relationship that belies the view that the negotiations leading to the TLA were purely disinterested business negotiations.” For example, in addition to royalty payments, Radiata agreed to disclose business plans, make best efforts to exploit the technology and grant CSIRO a royalty-free license and assignment of rights to Radiata’s improvements to the technology. Further, there were rapid improvements between the 1998 date of the TLA and the 2002/2003 hypothetical negotiation date : “Commercial viability of the technology escalated sharply as the 802.11a revision was adopted in September 1999 … and received a greater boost when the 802.11g revision was ratified in June 2003.” Perhaps concerned that this would improperly capture the value of the standard beyond the patent’s value, Judge Davis states in a footnote:
This is not an indication that the value of the ‘069 Patent increased soelely because it was included in the standard. Rather, the wireless marketplace as a whole benefited from the adoption of the standard.
Judge Davis found Cisco’s “primary problem” is using chip prices as the royalty base, because (1) the patent was not directed solely to a chip and (2) widespread infringement depressed chip prices:
CSIRO did not invent a wireless chip. Although it is largely undisputed that the inventive aspect of the ‘069 Patent is carried out in the PHY layer of the wireless chip, the chip itself is not the invention. The ‘069 Patent is a combination of techniques that largely solved the multipath problem for indoor wireless data communication. The benefit of the patent lies in the idea, not in the small amount of silicon that happens to be where that idea is physically implemented. Compounding this problem is the depression of chip prices in the damages period resulting from rampant infringement which occured in the wireless industry. Prior to 2008, outside of the Radiata TLA, no company in the industry sought a license from CSIRO to the ‘069 Patent and CSIRO received no royalties whatsoever for that technology. It is simply illogical to attempt to value the contributions of the ‘069 Patent based on wireless chip prices that were artificially deflated because of pervasive infringement. Basing a royalty solely on chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation captures the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual value.
Other CSIRO Licenses. Judge Davis dismissed other license agreements that CSIRO entered in or after 2008, which both experts agreed were not relevant to a hypothetical negotiation in 2002. The license came at a later time than the hypothetical negotiation, involved litigation settlements, involved worldwide licenses and varied widely in sales volumes at issue.
Court’s Hypothetical Negotiation Analysis. Judge Davis assumed a hypothetical negotiation in 2002/2003 with no “discount” for uncertainty as to liability given the assumption that the patents were valid and infringed. Judge Davis found a base starting royalty rate based on the Voluntary Licensing Program licensing rate and a 90-cents per end-product licensing offer Cisco made during negotiations, the latter being “the best evidence available of how Cisco valued the contribution of the ‘069 Patent … and is the best indicator of Cisco’s possible bid price at the time of the hypothetical negotiation.”
Judge Davis then considered various Georgia-Pacific factors for adjusting this starting royalty rate. Although CSIRO had a RAND-obligation for 802.11 revision “a” products, Judge Davis did not consider a modified Georgia-Pacific analysis for them given the small volume of revision “a” product sales, stating “a modified analysis as to only those products would have a de minimus impact on the overall royalty.” Judge Davis Davis then considered the several Georgia-Pacific factors, as follows:
- Factors 1-2, 6-7, 12-13. Judge Davis agreed with both experts that Georgia-Pacific factors 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, and 13 “are neutral and no adjustment to the base line royalty rate needs to be made in light of these factors.”
- Factor 3 (nature and scope of license). Judge Davis gave a downward adjustment because the hypothetical license would be limited to U.S. sales, but Cisco’s negotiation offer and CSIRO’s Voluntary Licensing Program implicitly used to set the hypothetical base royalty rate were for a worldwide license.
- Factor 4 (licensor’s established program). This factor warrants a downward adjustment because (1) “CSIRO was very willing to license the patented technology” and (2) CSIRO had a binding RAND obligation for the 802.11a products.
- Factor 5 (commercial relationship). This factor warrants a downward adjustment because CSIRO was a government R&D organization that “needed to license the ‘069 Patent in order to commercialize and monetize it.”
- Factor 8 (product profitability/success). This factor warrants an upward adjustment because the patented technology, “[a]lthough … not the only factor contributing to the growth of 802.11g products, it was an important one.” Further, IEEE continued to rely on the patented technology even though “CSIRO declined to issue letters of assurance and in the face of ongoing litigation involving the patent.” Accordingly, the patent “played a significant role in the commercial success of 802.11 products.”
- Factors 9 and 10 (utility over older modes, benefits, etc.). These two factors warrant an upward adjustment. The patented technology’s multipath solution provided significant improvements, including higher speeds, increased capacity, etc., and alternative technology did not have commercial success. Further, this remained core technology to the standard despite several revisions to the standard spanning over a decade.
- Factor 11 (extent defendant uses invention). This factor is neutral here because it already was accounted for in the starting baseline.
- Factor 13 (profit attributable to invention). This factor is neutral because, although the patent “played a significant role in the profitability of wireless products, … Cisco’s role in that profitability should not be diminished” such as Cisco “assum[ing] the business risk” in developing and marketing the products as well as many other non-patented features in the products.
- Factor 14 (expert opinion). This factor is neutral because the court rejected both experts’ damages models.
- Factor 15 (outcome of hypothetical negotiation). The court weighed all the factors and found they gave each party equal bargaining position and, thus, no adjustment was needed to the baseline rate of $0.90 to $1.90 per end-product with tiered values based on volume of sales.
In sum, all factors were neutral except factors 3 and 4 (downward adjustment) that were offset by factors 8-10 (upward adjustment). Judge Davis, however, did give a downward adjustment to consumer products based on the proportional profit difference between them and the enterprise products. The court then multiplied these tiered royalty rates by volumes of sales, discarded sales after the patent expired, discarded sales more than six years before the lawsuit was filed and assessed a total royalty damage of about $16.2 million.
Yesterday Cisco and Innovatio filed an Agreed Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice based on settlement of their litigation involving Innovatio WiFi standard essential patents. Cisco’s Mark Chandler issued a statement indicating that the case settled for $2.7 million, or about 3.2 cents for 85 million devices even though Judge Holderman ruled that a RAND royalty would be about 10 cents per unit and Innovatio reportedly sought over $2,000 per location from each coffee shop, hotel or other end-user of the WiFi devices. The settlement covers Cisco and all users of Cisco WiFi equipment. It will be interesting to see if Cisco’s success here will also translate to its similar action against Rockstar–another non-practicing, non-innovating patent monetization entity asserting alleged standard essential patents against end-users of Cisco equipment (cable operators) (see our Feb. 3, 2014 post).
Recall that Motorola and SonicWall also settled with Innovatio following Judge Holderman’s RAND ruling (see our Jan. 2, 2014 post). And a recent status conference filing indicates that remaining parties may be finalizing settlements with Innovatio.
The settlements may keep Judge Holderman’s RAND analysis on the books without appellate review, leaving Judge Robart’s RAND analysis in Microsoft v. Motorola to be the first and only pending appeal for appellate guidance on a detailed RAND royalty rate methodology–a question remains whether that review will be by the Federal Circuit or Ninth Circuit (see our Dec. 16, 2013 post). We say only appellate review of a “detailed RAND royalty rate methodology” because the Ericsson v. D-Link appeal pending before the Federal Circuit does involve review of a jury verdict damages award on Ericsson RAND-obligated WiFi patents–the jury awarded 15-cents per device for three WiFI SEPs where Ericsson had asked for 50-cents per device for all of its WiFi SEPs. But the black-box nature of that jury verdict may not provide as good a vehicle for appellate guidance on a detailed RAND royalty-rate methodology as presented in Judge Robart’s detailed opinion (see our Aug. 7, 2013 post on Judge Davis’ review of the Ericsson v. D-Link jury verdict as well as our Dec. 23, 2013 and Jan. 7, 2014 posts on some of the appeal amicus filings).