Administrative Law Judg (ALJ) Lord at the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently issued an Order striking patent misuse claims against Philips Lighting (Philips) raised by WAC Lighting and other respondents that were premised on Philips filing its Complaint in the ITC without making a license available “on standard (reasonable) and non-discriminatory terms.” This ruling provides incremental guidance on the specificity needed to plead a competition law claim based on standard essential patents (SEPs), including allegations of specific facts showing the anticompetitive effect of alleged improper SEP licensing activity. Continue Reading ALJ Lord dismisses SEP licensing-based patent misuse defenses (ITC Inv. No. 1081, Philips v. Feit Electric)
Magistrate Judge Fallon recently Recommended Dismissing competition law counterclaims brought by TCT Mobile (TCT) against Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 (IP Bridge) and Panasonic and Judge Bataillon has now Adopted that ruling. Those counterclaims were based on alleged improper conduct relating to standard essential patents (SEPs) on European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 2G, 3G and 4G wireless standards that IP Bridge acquired from Panasonic after those standards were adopted. While the standards were under development, Panasonic had committed to license the SEPs on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. TCT’s competition law counterclaims generally concerned allegations that:
- Panasonic made FRAND commitments it did not intend to keep in order to induce the standards body to keep Panasonic’s technology in the standards;
- After the standards were adopted, Panasonic transferred the patents to IP Bridge which offered to license the patents on terms that were not FRAND and
- There was some type of improper concerted action between Panasonic and IP Bridge (this aspect is fairly redacted and unclear).
This case presents an interesting nuance of competition claims against a party (IP Bridge) that acquired SEPs from an original owner (Panasonic) who made a FRAND commitment. In this case, TCT alleged that something about the transfer of the patents to IP Bridge was meant to circumvent Panasonic’s FRAND commitment (but the details of those allegations are redacted in the public court documents).
This case also indicates that an antitrust injury-in-fact cannot arise solely from a patent owner filing an infringement lawsuit on FRAND-committed SEPs. That’s because a successful FRAND defense by the accused infringer will lead to remedies consistent with the FRAND commitment and, in any event, any relief ultimately granted by the court would be lawful.
The decision also has a unique procedural posture. This is a decision by a magistrate judge that recommends to the presiding district court judge how to rule on the issue. Such magistrate judge recommendations are common in patent cases. The presiding district court judge usually adopts a magistrate judge’s recommendation, but is not required to do so. So we will await the district court judge’s decision whether to adopt Judge Fallon’s recommendation here.
Further, this decision concerns a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss causes of action based on the initial pleadings. Such motions are difficult to win because of the tremendous deference the court must give to the challenged pleading — e.g., the court considers whether TCT states a “plausible” claim if the court assumes (without deciding) that all factual allegations TCT raises are true and draws all reasonable inferences in TCT’s favor. And courts are even more reluctant to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against competition law claims, which may be factually complex and require information in the hands of the alleged wrong-doer that can be obtained only in discovery. In this case, however, TCT apparently had almost a year of discovery and two attempts to plead its competition law claims, which may have provided the court more comfort in its dispositive ruling here. Continue Reading Magistrate Judge Fallon recommends dismissing competition claims against SEP holder (Godo Kaisha IP Bridge v. TCL et al)
Yesterday, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the Antitrust Division Makan Delrahim spoke in Brussels about maintaining a close working relationship and coordination with European Union’s Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) in competition law enforcement. AAG Delrahim’s remarks included suggestion that the European competition authorities shift toward the more balanced approach to standard essential patents (SEPs) that he recently articulated for the U.S. (See our Dec. 20, 2017 post on AAG Delrahim’s remarks on shift in U.S. DOJ’s SEP enforcement approach). Some key points in AAG Delrahim’s remarks include:
- “I believe that strong protection of these [IP] rights drives innovation incentives, which in turn drive a successful economy.”
- “I worry that we have strayed too far in the direction of accommodating the concerns of technology licensees who participate in standard setting bodies, very likely at the risk of undermining incentives for the creation of new and innovative technologies.”
- The tension between innovators and implementers “is best resolved through free market competition and bargaining. And that bargaining process works best when standard setting bodies respect intellectual property rights … including the very important right to exclude.”
- If a patent owner violates a standard-setting commitment, “remedies under contract law, rather than antitrust remedies, are more appropriate to address licensee’s concerns.”
Below is a a complete excerpt of AAG Delrahim’s remarks in Brussels with respect to intellectual property and SEPs: Continue Reading U.S. DOJ Antitrust Head Makan Delrahim brings his message of balanced SEP competition law enforcement to Europe
European and U.S. competition authorities may be making a course correction toward a more balanced approach to standard essential patents (“SEPs”) following contemporary enforcement activity that had favored implementers over patent holders.
Specifically, recent remarks by the new administration’s U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) antitrust head explained that patent hold-up by patent owners may not be as big an issue as some had suggested and that patent hold-out by implementers may be a bigger concern. Indeed, he expressed concern about improper collusion among implementers within standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) to enact intellectual property rights (“IPR”) policies that unduly devalue patents and undermine innovation. These remarks from the new administration has caused many to question the viability of the IEEE ‘s 2015 IPR Policy change that was perceived as very implementer oriented, but not challenged by the prior DOJ administration. (See our Feb. 5, 2015 Post about the prior DOJ administration’s business review letter on the IEEE policy change).
Further, the European Commission (“EC”) recently issued non-binding guidance for SEPs that did not suggest bright line rules urged by implementers for negotiating SEP FRAND licenses–e.g., did not suggest component-level licensing and royalty base, rather than end product level—and reflects a balanced approach more consistent with long-standing industry custom and practice in implementing FRAND licensing commitments.
We provide a summary of these statements, but encourage you to read the DOJ remarks and EC guidance directly for yourself (they are not long), which may allow you to detect and avoid interpretive spin from those entrenched on either side of the issues. For example, some have suggested that the EC guidelines support licensing at the component level; but that’s not what the EC guidelines actually say and its been reported that the EC intentionally declined to suggest component-level licensing in these guidelines. Continue Reading U.S. and EU competition authorities may take a more balanced approach to SEPs
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued its annual 2017 Special 301
Report FINAL that “reviews the state of IP protection and enforcement in U.S. trading partners around the world.” (Report at 1). The report aims to “call out foreign countries and expose the laws, policies, and practices that failed to provide adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement for U.S. inventors, creators, brands, manufacturers, and service providers.” (Report at 1). Among the issues raised in this report are concerns that a foreign government may force U.S. standard essential patent (SEP) holders to enter license terms that devalue the patent and subject them to improper competition law enforcement. Continue Reading U.S. Trade Representative’s Report raises concerns about unfair foreign treatment of U.S. companies with standard essential patents
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) recently issued a press release stating its intent to issue a written decision that will impose an $865 Million sanctions and a corrective order against Qualcomm for abuse in licensing standard essential patents (“SEPs”) in the mobile communications industry. Specifically, on December 28, 2016, the KFTC released a three-page English-translated summary of a 27-page Korean-language press release. Qualcomm issued its own press release, which includes an unofficial English translation of the 27-page KFTC press release.
This was only a press release by the KFTC and an actual written decision has yet to issue from which any action will be taken. Accordingly, at this point we provide a summary of the KFTC Press Release and conclude with important questions or issues to look for when the actual written decision of the KFTC issues. For example, Korean-based Samsung had some of the same or similar licensing practices as U.S.-based Qualcomm and prevailed in U.S. litigation on whether such practices breached the same ETSI FRAND obligations at issue here. The KFTC written decision may show why Samsung’s activities were okay, but Qualcomm’s were not.
To be clear: This is a summary based on a review of an unofficial translation of the KFTC Press Release and may not reflect actual facts or the facts and theories upon which the KFTC ultimately bases its written decision. In other words, assume that the qualification “The KFTC Press Release may indicate that …” applies to everything below since there could be error in the KFTC’s factual findings, the unofficial translation of it, or our summary thereof. Continue Reading Korea FTC proposes sanctions against Qualcomm’s SEP licensing practices
Yesterday, Judge Andrews in the District of Delaware issued an Order that denied InterDigital’s motion to dismiss Microsoft’s Complaint that alleged violation of antitrust laws based on InterDigital’s enforcement of patents alleged to be essential to 3G and 4G cellular ETSI standards and subject to commitments to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. At this early procedural stage of the case, the issue was not whether Microsoft would prevail in the case or whether the allegations in the Complaint were true; rather, at this initial case stage Judge Andrews considered whether Microsoft had stated “plausible” claims against InterDigital upon which relief could be granted if what Microsoft alleged in the Complaint was true when viewing the Complaint in a light most favorable to Microsoft. He decided that was the case and is allowing the case to proceed.
This ruling itself is not necessarily important as a precedential matter given the relatively low threshold for surviving a motion to dismiss and inability to challenge the factual assertions, but this will be an interesting case to follow as it matures because it is one of the few contemporary instances of a U.S. court considering the application of competition law to standard essential patents (“SEPs”) with sophisticated parties on both sides of the issue. Continue Reading Judge Andrews permits Microsoft’s SEP-based antitrust claims against InterDigital to proceed (Microsoft v. InterDigital)
Today, a European Union high court issued a ruling that provides guidance on what steps the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent that may be essential to a standard should take before seeking injunctive relief. The court also ruled that a willing licensee should act without delay, provide a counter-offer, and actively pay royalties (in trust or otherwise) for past and on-going use of the patent while the parties negotiate toward a FRAND license. The court further ruled that there was no specific pre-filing steps needed for the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent to file suit seeking solely an accounting and monetary relief for past infringement (i.e., not injunctive).
The case involves patent owner (“proprietor”) Huawei asserting a European patent alleged essential to the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard against alleged infringer ZTE. That patent was subject to a commitment to license the patent on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND) made to the European Telecommunications Standards Insitute (ETSI).
ETSI has intellectual property right (IPR) policies that concern patents that are essential to ETSI standards. A patent is essential to the standard where it is not possible on technical grounds to make equipment that complies with the standard without infringing the patent. ETSI’s IPR policy provides that patent owners should be adequeately and fairly rewarded for the use of their patented technology, but also seeks to guard against such patents making standardized technology unavailable. Thus ETSI seeks a balance between the needs of standardization for public use and the rights of patent owners.
To this end, ETSI participants are required to timely disclose their patents that are essential to an ETSI standard. In response to such disclosure, ETSI will ask the patent owner to give an irrevocable FRAND commitment. ETSI is supposed to determine whether to suspend work on adopting the standard until such a commitment is received. ETSI does not check whether the patent actually is essential or valid. Further, ETSI does not define what would be a “license on FRAND terms.”
In April 2011, patent owner Huawei brought an action in German court against ZTE for infringing the LTE patent following failed negotiations. The parties had been in negotiations from November 2010 until end of March 2011. Huawei offered what it considered a FRAND royalty and ZTE responded with a cross-license offer. No agreement was reached, though ZTE continued to sell LTE devices. In its lawsuit, Huawei sought both injunctive and monetary relief.
The German court stayed its proceedings and referred specific issues to this European Union high court dealing with competition issues, based on the following questions:
(1) Does the proprietor of [an SEP] which informs a standardisation body that it is willing to grant any third party a license on [FRAND] terms abuse its dominant market position if it brings an action for an injunction against a patent infringer even though the infringer has declared that it is willing to negotiate concerning such a license? or
Is an abuse of the dominant market position to be presumed only where the infringer has submitted to the proprietor of the [SEP] an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing agreement which the patentee cannot refuse without unfairly impeding the infringer or breaching the prohibition of discrimination, and the infringer fulfils its contractual obligations for acts of use already performed in anticipation of the license to be granted?
(2) If abuse of a dominant market position is already to be presumed as a consequence of the infringer’s willingness to negotiate:
Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirements in relation to the willingness to negotiate? In particular, can willingness to negotiate be presumed where the patent infringer has merely stated (orally) in a general way that it is prepared to enter into negotiations, or must the infringer already have entered into negotiations by, for example, submitting specific conditions upon which it is prepared to conclude a licensing agreement?
(3) If the submission of an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing agreement is a prerequisite for abuse of a dominant market position:
Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirements in relation to that offer? Must the offer contain all the provisions which are normally included in licensing agreements in the field of technology in question? In particular, may the offer be made subject to the condition that the [SEP] is actually used and/or is shown to be valid?
(4) If the fulfilment of the infringer’s obligations arising from the licence that is to be granted is a prerequisite for the abuse of a dominant market position:
Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular requirements with regard to those acts of fulfilment? Is the infringer particularly required to render an account for past acts of use and/or to pay royalties? May an obligation to pay royalties be dischared, if necessary, by depositing a security?
(5) Do the conditions under which the abuse of a dominant positoin by the proprietor of a[n SEP] is to be presumed apply also to an action on the ground of other claims (for rendering of accounts, recall of products, damages) arising from a patent infringement?
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), referenced above, states as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
The European high court answered the questions above as follows:
1. Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant position, within the meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the manufacture of which that patent has been used, as long as:
— prior to bringing an action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and
— where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.
2. Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as not prohibiting, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings [i.e., the stayed German action], an undertaking in a dominant position and holding a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an undertaking to the standardisation body to grant licenses for that patent on FRAND terms, from bringing an action for infringement against the alleged infringer of its patent and seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of that patent or an award of damages in respect of those acts of use.
The court started by noting the balance it must strike between “maintaining free competition” based on “Article 102 TFEU prohibit[ing] abuses of a dominate position” and “the requirement to safeguard th[e] proprietor’s intellectual-property rights and its right to judicial protection.” The court further noted the limits of its ruling, stating that, in this case, “the existence of a dominant position has not been contested” and the questions to be addressed “relate only to the existence of an abuse”, thus “the analysis must be confined to the latter criterion.”
FRAND-Encumber SEPs Differ From Other Patents. The court stated that filing a lawsuit for patent infringement “forms part of the rights of the proprietor of an intellectual-property right” and normally is not an abuse of a dominant position. But there are “exceptional circumstances” when it may be an abuse. This case presents two distinguishing features from most patents. First, it involves a standard essential patent (SEP) that, unlike other patents, can preclude competitors from making standard compliant products. Second, the patent “obtained SEP status only in return for the proprietor’s irrevocable undertaking … that it is prepared to grant licences on FRAND terms.” Thus, a refusal to grant such a license “may, in principle, constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.”
Balance High Level of Protection Given Patent Rights. The court noted that applicable law “provides for a range of legal remedies aimed at ensuring a high level of protection for intellectual-property rights in the internal market, and the right to effective judicial protection.” This counsels not hindering a patent owner’s right to seek judicial relief and requiring a user to obtain a license before using the patented technology:
This need for a high level of protection for intellectual-property rights means that, in principle, the proprietor may not be deprived of the right to have recourse to legal proceedings to ensure effective enforcement of his exclusive rights, and that, in principle, the user of those rights, if he is not the proprietor, is required to obtain a licence prior to any use.
This is balanced with considerations for FRAND-encumbered SEPs, which “justif[ies] the imposition … of an obligation to comply with specific requirements when bringing actions against alleged infringers for a prohibitory injunction.”
First Step – Prior Notice to Infringer. The court thus ruled that, before bringing suit for injunctive relief, an SEP owner must “first … alert the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that SEP and specifying the way in which it has been infringed.” One reason for this is that, because there are a large number of patents that may be essential to a standard, the accused infringer may not “necessarily be aware that it is using the teaching of an SEP that is both valid and essential to a standard.”
Second Step – Written FRAND Terms. If, after notice, the alleged infringer “expressed its willingness to conclude” a FRAND license, the SEP owner must then provide “a specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms … specifying, in particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is to be calculated.” The court explained it was proper to have the SEP owner make such an offer, who may have nonpublic agreements with other licensees, since the patent owner “is better placed to check whether its offer complies with the condition of non-discrimination than is the alleged infringer.”
Accused Infringer’s Obligation. An accused infringer has its own obligations before it can take advantage of a FRAND defense.
First, if an accused infringer objects to the proferred license offer, it must submit, “promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms.” This response must be in “good faith” with “no delaying tactics”:
[I]t is for the alleged infringer diligently to respond to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a point which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.
Second, if its counter-offer is rejected, an accused infringer who already has been selling or otherwise using the technology before a license is entered must provide “appropriate security” for the past use of the technology and render an account of same:
The calculation of that security must include, inter alia, the number of the past acts of use of the SEP, and the alleged infringer must be able to render an account in respect of those acts of use.
Third-Party Royalty Determination. If the parties do not reach agreement, they can seek a “royalty determined by an independent third party, by decision without delay.”
Can Challenge Patent. The court ruled that, because the standard setting body did not determine essentiality or validity, the accused infringer should be allowed to challenge whether the patent is infringed, essential or valid during the negotiations or to reserve the right to do so in the future.
No Abuse If Seeking Past Money Damages. The court ruled that “seeking the rendering of accounts in relation to past acts of use of [an] SEP or an award of damages in respect of those acts” are not an abuse of dominance, because such actions “do not have a direct impact on products complying with the standard … appearing or remaining on the market.”
Today, the Supreme Court declined to overrule its prior decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), and maintained its ruling that a patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention where the use occurs after the patent term has expired. The Supreme Court held that stare decisis ruled the day, and it would be up to Congress to change the Brulotte rule if a change is to be made. The Court also gave advice on how to structure an agreement to avoid the Brulotte rule.
Further, in explaining the strength that stare decisis plays in patent cases, the Court gave insight into distinctions between competition issues under the Sherman Act–where courts are more expected to overrule prior decisions based on newer economic theories–and patent (as property law) and contract law where parties rely on settled decisions and Congress is the more appropriate body to overrule prior case rulings.
Justice Kagan authored the opinion; Justices Alito authored a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.
The patent at issue (U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856) allows “children (and young-at-heart adults)” to role play as “a spider person” by shooting “webs” (i.e., pressurized string) from the palm of their hand. The patent owner, Kimble, sought to sell or license his patent to Marvel Entertainment for their Spider-Man character. Marvel did not buy or license the patent. But Marvel later sold its own “Web Blaster” toy that used a canister of foam to shoot a web. The patent owner sued Marvel in 1997 and they reached a settlement agreement in which Marvel bought the patent for a lump sum (about $500,000) and a 3% royalty royalty on Marvel’s future sales of the Web Blaster and similar products. The agreement provided no end to such running royalty payments.
When entering the agreement, neither party had considered the Supreme Court’s Brulotte decision that prevents a patentee from receiving royalties for sales made after the patent expires. But Marvel did later, and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it need not pay royalties after the patent expired in 2010. The Brulotte case involved a patent owner who maintained ownership while licensing the patent at a running royalty; in this case, however, the running royalty was part of the sale of the patent to the party making the royalty payments. The Supreme Court noted that “no one here disputes that Brulotte covers a transaction structured in that alternative way.”
The district court agreed with Marvel and applied Brulotte to preclude royalty payments after the patent expired. The Ninth Circuit reluctantly affirmed, stating that the Brulotte rule “is counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing.”
Following the theme presented, the Supreme Court initially noted that “Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers, but only for a limited time.” (emphasis added) The Court has “carefully guarded that cut-off date.”
The Court noted that the Brulotte rule may “prevent some parties from entering into deals they desire.” But the Court also noted that “parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve those same ends.” For example, parties can (1) amortize payments after the patent expires for products sold during the royalty period, (2) require payment until the last of several licensed patents expire, (3) tie royalties to non-patent rights or (4) make “business arrangements other than royalties–all kinds of joint ventures”:
Yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve those same ends. To start, Brulotte allows a licensee to defer payments for pre-expiration use of a patent into the post-expiration period; all the decision bars are royalties for using an invention after it has moved into the public domain. A licensee could agree, for example, to pay the licensor a sum equal to 10% of sales during the 20-year patent term, but to amortize that amount over 40 years. That arrangement would at least bring down early outlays, even if it would not do everything the parties might want to allocate risk over a long time frame. And parties have still more options when a licensing agreement covers either multiple patents or additional non-patent rights. Under Brulotte, royalties may run until the latest-running patent covered in the parties’ agreement expires. Too, post-expiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to a non-patent right–even when close related to a patent. That means, for example, that a license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5% royalty during the patent period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4% royalty afterward (as payment for the trade secret alone). Finally and most broadly, Brulotte poses no bar to business arrangements other than royalties–all kinds of joint ventures, for example–that enable parties to share the risks and rewards of commercializing an invention.
The Court stated that the Brulotte rule “is simplicity itself to apply”:
A court need only ask whether a licensing agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent. If not, no problem; if so, no dice.
The Court stressed the importance of stare decisis — “the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions” — particularly in the areas of “property (patents) and contracts (licensing agreements)” where “parties are especially likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs.” Keeping with the theme, the Supreme Court called this context a “superpowered form of stare decisis” requiring “a superspecial justification to warrant reversing Brulotte.” (emphasis added)
The Court discussed at length the patent owner’s competition law arguments, but found them ill-suited in the patent context. Basically, competition law under the Sherman Act may be based on economic theory that may change over time and, hence, may require courts to be more inclined to overrule prior decisions where “to overturn [a prior] decision in light of sounder economic reasoning was to take them ‘on [their] own terms.'”. But patent law interprets statutes where stare decisis is more important and “Congress is the right entity to fix” problematic court rulings, the Court stating:
Although some of [Brulotte’s] language invoked economic concepts, the Court did not rely on the notion that post-patent royalties harm competition. Nor is that surprising. The patent laws–unlike the Sherman Act–do not aim to maximize competition (to a large extent, the opposite). And the patent term–unlike the “restraint of trade” standard–provides an all-encompassing bright-line rule, rather than calling for practice-specific analysis.
There are a couple of programs coming up this week and next that you may want to check out on the IEEE’s recent intellectual property rights (“IPR”) policy change (see our Feb. 3, 2015 post and Feb. 5, 2015 post). Both of these are programs that can be accessed remotely.
ABA Program. This Tuesday, March 10, 2015 from 2:30 to 4:00pm Eastern, the American Bar Association is having a program entitled “An Analysis of the DOJ’s Business Review Letter.” The program will be moderated by Koren W. Wong-Ervin of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) with speakers from the FTC, U.S. Department of Justice, industry (Qualcomm) and private practice. More particulars and registration information can be found at the ABA website.
IPO Program. Next Wednesday, March 18, 2015 from 2:00 pm to 3:00 pm Eastern, the Intellectual Property Owners Association is having a webinar entitled “The Future of Standards: What’s Next After the IEEE Shift.” The program will have speakers from industry (IBM and Intel) and private practice, including our own David Long. More particulars and registration information can be found at the IPO website.