This page includes links to papers dealing with standard essential patents or other patent issues.  We welcome suggestions to add to this list.

2018

• Jorge Padilla, Douglas H. Ginsburg and Koren Wong-Ervin, Antitrust Analysis Involving Intellectual Property and Standards: Implications from Economics, George Mason Law Review (2018)

2017

• Douglas H. Ginsburg and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, The Department of Justice’s Long-Awaited and Much Needed Course-Correction on FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series (Nov. 2017)
• Anne Layne-Farrar and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European Union, India, and the United States, Jindal Global Law School Law Review (Fall 2017)
• Koren Wong-Ervin, Evan Hicks and Ariel Slonium, Tying and Bundling Involving Standard-Essential Patents, George Mason Law Review (2017)

2016

• Jorge Padilla and Koren Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level, (Oct. 2016)
• David W. Long, Litigating Standard Essential Patents at the U.S. International Trade Commission, AIPLA Mid-Winter Institute (Jan. 2016).
• Koren W. Wong-Ervin and Joshua D. Wright, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting, George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper Series (2016)
• David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, Tusher Center for the Management of Intellectual Capital, University of California at Berkeley Working Paper Series No. 11 (Jan. 2016)

2015

• Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin and Joshua D. Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, George Mason University Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2015)

2014

 

2013

• J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 931 (Dec. 2013).
• Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2243026, Nov. 5, 2013).
• F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects From Different Approaches To Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, Journal of Competition Law & Economic, Vol. 9, Issue 4 (Nov. 4, 2013).
• Tom Schaumberg & Emi Ito Ortiz, Why Can’t They be FRANDs?  Concerns About the ITC’s Approach to Standard-Essential Patent Cases Are Unwarranted, National Law Review (Feb. 25, 2013).
• James Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld., The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 1, 1 (Jan. 23, 2013).

2012

• Jorge L. Contreras, Rethinking RAND: SDO-Based Approaches to Patent Licensing Commitments,. ITU Patent Roundtable, Geneva (Oct. 10, 2012)
• Brian T. Yeh, Availability of Injunctive Relief for Standard-Essential Patent Holders, CRS Report for Congress 7-5700 (Sep. 7, 2012).
• Tim Pohlmann, Six Essays On Patenting and Coordination In ICT Standardization: Empirical Analysis of Essential Patents, Patent Pools, and Standards Consortia, (Universitätsbibliothek der Technischen Universität Berlin, Aug. 30, 2012).
• Anne Layne-Farrar & Gerard Llobet, Moving Beyond Simply Examples: Assessing the Incremental Value Rule within Standards, Prepared for the 2012 CRESSE Conference (June 2012).
• Michael A. Carrier, A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 2 (May 3, 2012).
• Roger G. Brooks, Licensing and Litigation Under the RAND Umbrella, National Law Journal (Jan. 23, 2012).
• Richard A. Epstein, F. SCott Kieff & DAniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 1-46 (2012)

2011

• Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the Development of Voluntary Technical Standards, National Inst. of Standards and Tech., 1 (GCR 11-934, June 27, 2011).
• Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, A NAASTy alternative to RAND pricing commitments, 35 Telecommunications Policy, 1010 (2011).
• Roger G. Brooks, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 Int’l J. IT Standards & Standardization Research 1 (June 2011).
• Richard Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations by Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 Antitrust L.J., 855 (2011).

2010

• Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates And Licensing Strategies For Essential Patents On LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards, les Nouvelles (Sep. 2010).

2009

2008

• Anne Layne-Farrar, Preventing Patent Hold up: An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 445 (May 5, 2008).
• Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet, & A. Jorge Padilla, Are Joint Negotiations in Standard Setting “Reasonably Necessary”?, (CEMFI Working Paper No. 0808, May 2008).
• Pat Treacy & Sophie Lawrance, FRANDly Fire: Are Industry Standards Doing More Harm Than Good? 3 JIPLP 1, 22 (2008).
• George S. Cary, Larry C. Work-Dembowski, & Paul S. Hayes, Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1241 (2008).
• Mikko Valimaki, A Flexible Approach to RAND Licensing, 29 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 686 (2008).

2007

• Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking, and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 Eur. Competition J. 101 (June 2007).
• Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla, & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 Antitrust L.J., 671 (Jan. 2007).
• Damien Gerardin & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante Competition in a Standard-Setting Environment, 3 Comp. Pol. Int. 79 (2007).
• Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply to Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2163  (2007).
• Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991  (2007).

2006

• Tim Frain, Patents in Standards and Interoperability, (World Intellectual Property Organization, Nov. 29, 2006).
• Sadao Nagaoka, Tomoyuki Shimbo, & Naotoshi Tsukada, The Structure and the Evolution of Essential Patents For Standards: Lessons From Three IT Standards, (Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, Sep. 2006).
• Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 351 (2006).

2005

2004

2003

• Janice M. Mueller, Potential Antitrust Liability Based on a Patent Owner’s Manipulation of Industry Standard Setting, Proceedings of ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting (Feb. 23, 2003).